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1. Introduction  
The last three decades have witnessed the development of a phenomenon now central in the evolution 
of capitalist economies: the ‘financialisation’ of the economy. Financialisation is summarized as an 
ongoing and self-reinforcing economic and social process that manifests itself in the growing 
prominence and influence of behaviours derived from the financial sector (Epstein, 2005). Following 
van der Zwan (2014), we can highlight three main features of this process: a) a new regime of 
accumulation largely shaped around financial motives, b) the consolidation of the ‘shareholder value’ 
as the key principle in corporate governance, and c) the dissemination of practices linked to finance 
within everyday life (pension schemes, mortgages provision, healthcare etc.). This article aims at 
contributing to the understanding of the impact of the first two aspects of financialisation on 
investment.  
 The mainstream literature asserts that financial markets facilitate the financing and the 
efficient allocation of investment (Beck et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005; Love, 2003). However, Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) warn against the robustness of these results. Moreover, the effect of stock market 
development on growth is found to be weaker than that of the banking sector (Arestis et al., 2001). 
Recently after the 2007-2008 crash, the impact of the disproportionate growth of the financial system 
has been questioned in some mainstream contributions as well (Beck et al., 2014; Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi, 2015; Cournède et al., 2015; Law and Singh, 2014). In particular, Law and Singh (2014) 
argue that there is a ‘threshold effect’ in the relationship between the extension of financial resources 
and growth; thus the expansion of the financial system is beneficial to growth only up to a point. 
Recently, a similar argument has been put forward by an IMF discussion note with respect to 
developing and emerging markets (Sahay et al., 2015), which argues that ‘too much finance’ increases 
both economic and financial volatility. 
 The Post-Keynesian literature on financialisation illustrates the negative impacts of expanding 
financial sector on income distribution and demand (Hein, 2013; Onaran et al., 2010), and in particular 
on investment (Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 2015; Dallery, 2009; Stockhammer, 2004, 2006) .  A 
similar argument can be found in the marxist literature, where the long-term trajectories of the 
economies gravitate more around the financial sector and less around the productive one (Foster, 
2010). Since the 1980s, the slow down in investment and growth went along with a rise in the interest 
and dividend payments and share buybacks of the non-financial corporations (NFCs), which 
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‘punctured’ the value generated by the NFCs (Duménil and Levy, 2004). Therefore, companies 
experienced a significant reduction in available funds for physical investments.1 
 In the recent years, there has been also an increasing interest in studying the different features 
of financialisation in the context of developing and emerging economies2. In particular, Bracking 
(2012) provides an analysis of the relationship between financial liberalization and the changing 
patterns of exploitation of natural resources, whilst Aitken (2013) focuses on the perverse effect of 
financialisation on microcredit practices. Karwowski and Stockhammer (2016) provide an overview 
for several emerging countries based on the comparison of various macroeconomic aspects of 
financialization (e.g. financial deregulation, financial inflows, business and household debt). The 
authors find a considerable degree of variability in the intensity of financialization in the different 
countries.  
Despite an expanding theoretical literature on the effects of financialisation, the empirical 
evidence is predominantly relegated to a macroeconomic perspective, especially in the case of 
physical investment. While the origins of the microeconomic approach to the impact of finance on 
investment can be traced back to Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999), to the best of our 
knowledge only Orhangazi (2008), Demir (2007; 2009), and Tori and Onaran (2015; 2017) analyse 
empirically the effects of financialisation on accumulation from a microeconomic perspective.  
The novelty of this article is, to provide micro-econometric evidence on the effects of 
financialisation on investment using firm level data for both developed and emerging economies. We 
thus propose a comprehensive empirical assessment about the effects of financialization on corporate 
investments in various contexts, providing insights on both the relationship between investment 
decisions and external finance, and on the behavioural change regarding investment behaviours and 
‘speculative’ activities. In addition, our results can be useful to develop the current microeconomic 
theory of the firm. 
First, we focus on developed economies based on the cases of the USA, Japan, and a group 
of Western European countries (the 15 old Members states of the EU, Norway, and Switzerland). 
Next, we present the results for the developing world based on the group of all developing countries 
as well as the group of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and country specific 
estimations for South Africa, South Korea, India, and China, for which there are data for a sufficiently 
large number of companies. 
                                                          
1 In contrast, some authors of the Marxian tradition (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; Kliman and Williams, 2014) 
argue for a reversed causality, that is financialisation of the economy should be understood as a consequence, 
and not as a cause of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. 
2 See Bonizzi (2013) and Tyson and McKinley (2014) for a survey.  
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 The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key theoretical 
and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the alternative specifications of the 
investment model. Section 4 introduces the data and the stylized facts of our sample. Section 5 
discusses the estimation methodology. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The relationship between liquidity constraints, financialisation, and the accumulation of fixed 
assets  
In the earlier ‘accelerator investment models’ (e.g. Evans, 1967; Kuh and Meyer, 1955) investment 
ismodelled as a function of expected profitability measured by sales. In contrast, the early neoclassical 
approach models the firm's investment decision as a static maximization problem of discounted flows 
of profits over an infinite time horizon (Jorgenson, 1963, 1971). As an alternative, investment models 
based on the maximization of the expected cash flows (or market value) in the presence of adjustment 
costs and expectations, which take the dynamic process explicitly into account, have been proposed 
(Chirinko, 1993). Within this group, the so-called ‘Q model’ of Brainard and Tobin (1968), which 
models investment using the Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of the firm’s stock market 
valuation to its capital replacement cost, has been widely used. However, firm-level empirical 
analysis has failed to provide evidence of a strong explanatory power of the Q variable (Bond et al., 
1992; Hayashi and Inoue, 1991). Explanations of this finding focused on the bias of the stock market 
evaluation due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic ‘financial bubbles’ 
(Bond and Cummins, 2001; Bond et al., 2004). But more importantly, as argued by Hubbard (1998), 
the source of financing matter for investment.  
Empirical evidence shows that cash-flows, that is internal funds, are important determinants 
of investment (Blundell et al., 1992; Brown et al., 2009; Fazzari et al., 1988). In particular, Fazzari et 
al. (1988) show that fluctuations in internal finance, as reflected by cash-flows, are statistically more 
important than the stock market evaluation in determining the level of accumulation. Liquidity 
constraints play a crucial role in determining investment (Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; Fazzari and 
Petersen, 1993; Kadapakkam et al., 1998). In addition, cash flow always has a signficant positive 
effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock market evaluation and debt are mixed (Bloom 
et al., 2007; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Bond et al., 2003; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990).  The 
mainstream investment literature argues that companies’ financing issues mainly derive from agency 
problems, and the development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Bond et al., 2003; 
Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008; Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 
2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). However, companies’ financial flows are not directly taken 
into account in these analyses. As a result of the transformation of the economies towards a 
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financialized stage in the last decades, the mainstream models of investment may be misspecified due 
to their neglect of some important factors in the firms’ financing and investment decision.  
 The Post-Keynesian literature offers a more holistic approach to the analysis of the effect of 
financial markets on investment, where NFCs are far from passive players under the control of 
oversized financial markets. In addition to (or even partially substituting) physical investments, NFCs 
can readily accumulate financial assets. The Post-Keynesian literature conceives the firm as a 
‘battlefield’ for different vested interests (Stockhammer, 2006). The most visible type of internal 
conflict is reflected in shareholders’ preference for short-term profitability, which undermines the 
accumulation of fixed capital (Dallery, 2009; Hein and van Treeck, 2008). There is a ‘growth-profit 
trade-off’ within the managerial decision-making process of firms (Lavoie, 2014). The increasing 
involvement of the NFCs in finance-related activities is analysed primarily as a consequence of a 
change in the corporate governance (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000). From the early 1980s onwards, 
there has been an increased orientation towards maximizing the ‘shareholder value’ (Rappaport, 
1999). While the former imperative of the management has been to ‘retain and re-invest’, under the 
shareholder value orientation, to ‘downsize plants and distribute earnings’ is paramount.  This strand 
of literature argues that this behavioral change has had a negative effect on long-term investment. 
Both distributing dividends and boosting share prices through share buyback operations has gained 
importance in this new era (De Ridder, 2009). Furthermore, firms find investing in reversible short-
term financial assets as an attractive alternative to irreversible long-term fixed investment, and 
thereby the increased availability of financial assets may crowd out physical investment in core 
activities. 
Regarding the firm level effect of finance on investment, Fazzari and Mott (1986) model 
investment as a function of three key variables: sales (as a proxy for capacity utilization), internal 
finance, that is ‘less expensive’ retained earnings, and interest payments, which form a ‘committed 
constraint’ on the available cash flow. In another microeconomic analysis, Ndikumana (1999) finds 
negative effects of both stock and flows of debt. Firm’s indebtedness not only reduces the cash flow 
(via interest payments), but also affects the sustainability  of investments. However, Fazzari and Mott 
(1986) and Ndikumana (1999) do not model the impact of financial revenues, which is an important 
dimension of firms’ behaviour in this new era. To the best of our knowledge, there are only few 
microeconomic analysis that look at the effects of financial incomes of NFCs. Orhangazi (2008) finds 
a negative effect of financial payments and long-term debt on accumulation in the NFCs in the USA. 
The effects of financial incomes on investment depend on the firm size and sector, with a significant 
negative crowding out effect for larger firms, and a positive effect for the smaller firms in the non-
durables sector, indicating its dual role as a source of internal finance. Demir (2007, 2009) focuses 
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on Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey. The author finds that financial liberalization in these three 
emerging countries channelled savings from the productive sector towards financial speculation, thus 
reducing the availabilty of funds for long-term physical investment (Demir, 2007). Moreover, 
increasing returns on financial assets relative to fixed assets significantly reduced accumulation in 
these emerging markets’ NFCs (Demir, 2009).  
Event though the available evidence depict financialisation as a phenomenon common to both 
advanced and developing economies, the different institutional and social settings at country or/and 
regional level reveal the presence of ‘varieties of financialisation’ (Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013; Pike 
and Pollard, 2010). 
Building on this literature, in the next section we describe different specifications of the model 
of investment, which take into account explicitly the effects of both financial income and payments 
on the NFCs’ investment. 
 
3. The specifications of the model 
Investment is an intrinsically dynamic process (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Lopez and Mott, 1999), and 
there is a path dependency that links past and future levels of investment. Therefore, in line with the 
literature, we include the lagged investment as an explanatory variable in our specifications (Ford and 
Poret, 1991; Kopcke and Brauman, 2001; Orhangazi, 2008). Also all other explanatory variables are 
lagged in order to depict the ‘adjustment processes’.  
 To capture the potential effects of two key financial channels, we enrich the model proposed 
by Fazzari and Mott (1986). Equation (1) presents our specification for the rate of accumulation of 
capital (investment/capital), I/K:   
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where I is the addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, π is operating income,  S is net 
sales, F is the sum of cash dividends and interest paid on debt, whilst 𝜋𝐹 is the total non-operating 
(financial) income as the sum of interest and dividends received by the company. i is the firm index, 
Βt identifies a set of time-dummies to control for unobservable time-specific effects common to all 
firms in the different estimations, whilst the standard disturbance term εit captures firm-specific fixed 
effects and idiosyncratic shocks. All variables are introduced in first lag to reflect the time 
consideration in the investment plans. The operating income/fixed assets ratio is a measure of the 
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profit rate, the sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity utilization, financial 
payments/fixed assets and non-operating income/ fixed assets are the two measures of the impact of 
financialisation. We expect positive effects of the lagged accumulation rate, profit rate, and sales on 
investment. In contrast, in the light of the macroeconomic and microeconomic Post-Keynesian 
literature, we expect the impact of total financial payments (or ‘cash commitments’) to be negative. 
In this model cash dividends are conceived both as a reduction of available internal funds, and as 
reflecting behavioural changes due to the ‘shareholder value orientation’ (henceforth SVO) as 
suggested by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000).  
Furthermore, not only do NFCs use part of their funds to pay interest and dividend to the 
financial sector, but they can also more than before pursue non-operating financial investment 
themselves, thus receiving financial income. We include the sum of interests and dividends received 
by the NFCs (πF)  as a ratio to K as an explanatory variable3.  
The composite measure for outward financialisation, F, which is the sum of interest and dividend 
payments (as a ratio to K), capturing a) the liquidity effect of interest payments, and b) the additional 
behavioural effect of the SVO. In brief, F reflects the financial outflows, while πF  reflects the 
financial inflows. Theoretically, the sign of the effect of financial income on investment is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, these incomes may have a positive impact on accumulation of fixed assets by easing 
the liquidity constraint faced by firms. In particular, this can be the case for relatively smaller 
companies, which are more likely to experience liquidity restrictions compared to larger corporations. 
On the other hand, financial activities can also be detrimental to physical investment, since the NFCs 
will be attracted by short-term, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in long-term, 
irreversible physical investment. In order to explore the potential different effect of financial 
payments in small vs. large companies in different economic areas, we estimate an extended version 
of specification (1) as,  
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3 Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-operating financial incomes of NFCs. In fact 
Krippner (2005) shows how capital gains account for a considerable part of NFCs financial profits. However, 
as recognised by Orhangazi (2008) with respect to Compustat database, also in Worldscope data on the 
NFCs’ capital gains are not available.  
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where the dummy variable Dn takes the value 1 if the average total assets of company i lies in 
the lower n percentile of the distribution, and takes the value 0 otherwise. The dummy is interacted 
with the financial incomes. We interacted financial incomes with different levels of total assets for 
each country/group.  In this specification, while β5 is the effect of financial incomes in large 
companies, β5 + β6  capture the effect of financial incomes in smaller companies. 
With equations (1) and (2) we aim at introducing a full model of firm-level investment that is 
coherent with the Post-Keynesian tradition of investment analysis, and that a) takes into account the 
inherent irreversibility of physical investment, b) controls for the independent effect of profitability 
and demand, c) highlights the effects of financial relations, d) makes a clear distinction between 
operating and non-operating activities, and e) treats financial outflows and inflows (i.e. both outward 
and inward financialisation) as fundamental determinants.4  
 
4. Data and stylized facts  
We extracted our data from the Worldscope database of publicly listed firm’s balance sheets, which 
contains standardized accounting information about not only investment, sales, profits, interest and 
dividend payments but also companies’ financial incomes. Standardized data on financial payments 
and, in particular, financial incomes are difficult to find; our database allows us to have a 
comprehensive variable for our estimations. Worldscope database has been acknowledged as a 
valuable source in the literature on firm-level investment analysis (e.g. Cleary 1999; Love, 2003; 
Love and Zicchino, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005). Table 1 summarize the countries included 
in our dataset. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
We extracted data for all active, publicly listed non-financial companies.  Our data are annual for the 
period of 1995-2015. Due data availability, the individual country cases is limited to large economies 
with high numbers of publicly listed NFCs, as reliable estimations using dynamic panel data 
methodology requires a substantial number of cross sections, which makes country specific 
estimations unreliable for relatively smaller countries.  
                                                          
4 We also extended the model with total debt/fixed capital, and change in or the square of this ratio, but we 
did not find any statistically significant effects. Results are available upon request. An extended model with 
share buybacks was not feasible due to lack of data.  
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It is well known that the presence of outliers usually characterizes firm-level data. To prevent 
biased estimations, we apply a data screening process, by excluding extreme outliers from the 
sample.5 First, we select firms that have at least three consecutive observations for the dependent 
variable (I/K), which is also required for econometric purposes (Roodman, 2009). Second, we 
excluded companies with rate of accumulation (I/K) higher than 2.5, representing a growth rate of 
capital stock higher than 250 per cent. Third, we drop all the companies with a permanent negative 
mean net operating income for the whole period. Finally, we exclude observations in the upper and 
lower 1 per cent of each variable’s distribution. With these adjustments, we finally have a total 
number of 161039 observations and 13289 companies. Next, we present the stylized facts of our 
sample for different country groups, and selected countries. 
Figure 1a and Figure 1b show the trends of the ratio of investment (addition to fixed assets) 
to operating income. A common feature of the last twenty years has been a reduction in the 
reinvestment of profit of NFCs in all economic areas. Europe show the highest fall in this ratio (-32 
per cent), followed by BRICS (-25 per cent). There have been substantial decreases also in the USA 
and Japan.  
 
[Figure 1.a] 
[Figure 1.b] 
 
In the same period, the ratio of financial assets to fixed assets of the NFCs increased 
substantially (Figures from 2.1 to 2.12a). The magnitude of this increase has been particularly high 
for the developing countries as a whole. The BRICS have experienced an increase of 277 per cent in 
the ratio of financial assets to fixed assets. To summarize, NFCs across the world diverted funds from 
real investment towards the accumulation of non-operating financial assets.  
 
[Figures 2.1a to 2.9a] 
[Figures 2.1b to 2.9b] 
 
Figures from 2.1 to 2.12b show the relationships between the rate of accumulation of physical 
capital and our two measures of financialisation - financial payments and incomes as a ratio to total 
assets- to detect the double-sided impact of financialisation. The increasing trends in the financial 
payments and incomes along with the stagnant rate of accumulation highlights the adverse effect of 
                                                          
5 Guariglia and Carpenter (2008), Love and Zichino (2006), Chirinko et al. (1999) and Orhangazi (2008) 
follow similar strategies to define and exclude the outliers. Our estimations are robust to the inclusion of the 
outliers.  
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the increasing orientation of NFCs towards non-operating activities. The rate of accumulations have 
been overall stagnant (in particular for the companies in Europe) or decreasing (BRICS). At the same 
time, NFCs’ financial payments (dividends plus interests) have been increasing significantly, with 
the highest ratio to fixed assets reached in Europe. The European companies also had the highest level 
of non-operating incomes (as a ratio to fixed assets), but the 2007-8 crisis had led to a reversal in the 
NFCs’ financial income. In all other areas, financial income increased considerably over the whole 
period including after the Great Recession, with BRICS’ companies showing the most dramatic rise.  
In The USA the financial assets as a ratio to fixed assets has reached 3.0 in 2015. The rate of 
accumulation remained stagnant and slightly fell. In contrast, in the last twenty years financial 
payouts almost doubled, reaching 30 per cent of fixed assets.    
Japanese companies experienced a strong decline in the share of operating profit devoted to 
accumulation of fixed assets (I/π) from 1998 to 2000. However, after this period, reinvested profit 
remained relatively stable around 39 per cent. An increasing accumulation of financial assets, in line 
with the trends in other countries, resulted in increasing financial income, which, however, went along 
with a rise in the rate of accumulation after 2004 until the Great Recession. The unique low levels of 
financial payments in Japanese NFCs are due to the decreasing interest expenses, which mitigated 
the contemporaneous increase in cash dividends distributed to shareholders (See Figure A1 in the 
Appendix). 
The rate of reinvestment in South Korean NFCs shows a dynamic similar to what we described 
for Japanese ones. It declined after the Asian crisis of 1997 and then stabilized around an average of 
39 per cent. Financial assets as a ratio to total assets are lower than in other countries albeit an increase 
through time. The rate of accumulation has been decreasing along with a sharp increase in non-
operating financial income, especially after 2003. As in Japan, South Korean companies benefited 
from a decrease in interest paid on debt (See Figure A2 in the Appendix) and this is reflected in the 
downward trend of total financial payments. 
As shown for the majority of the countries, also South African NFCs decreased the portion of 
operating income devoted to physical investment (from 49 per cent to 37 per cent), and increased the 
accumulation of financial assets over fixed ones (from 0.32 to 1.25). South African NFCs 
substantially increased their dividends distributed and interest paid, with total payments recovering 
after a downturn in 2008. The increase in financial income continued until the crisis as well.  
Also in India, NFCs decreased their rate of reinvestment while increasing the accumulation 
of financial assets. However, both measures of financialisation remained flat. The low level of 
financial payments is due to decreasing interest paid  from 2001, and to decreasing dividends 
distributed from 2004 (See Figure A3 in the Appendix).  
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In China, the rate of reinvestment of NFCs decreased substantially only after 2005, whilst the 
increase in the accumulation of financial assets started in 2006. Chinese NFCs had an increasing rate 
of accumulation, starting from the lowest level in 1998 (0.13 per cent) to the peak in 2011 (0.34 per 
cent). Financial payments remained stable at low levels for most of the period, and started to increase 
after 2009. NFCs’ non-operating financial income decreased in the first part of the 2000s and started 
increasing in 2006, in parallel to the accumulation of financial assets. 
In conclusion, the stylized facts for the various groups of NFCs considered show a) a stagnant 
rate of accumulation b) a declining rate of reinvestment of operating income c) an increase in the 
overall degree of financialisation in terms of financial assets, financial income as well as financial 
payments both in the different country groups and in the single countries in both the developed and 
developing world. These stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between the rate of 
accumulation and the financial activities of NFCs, which will be investigated further via econometric 
estimations in the next section.   
 
5. Estimation methodology  
The two specifications presented in section 3 are estimated using a dynamic panel-data model 
including one lag of the accumulation rate as explanatory variables. As explained in section 3, 
investment is an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon.  
In dynamic panel data models, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the 
lagged dependent variables. Therefore, standard estimators (e.g. Ordinary or Generalized Least 
Squares) would be inconsistent. Therefore, we estimate our models using a difference-GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This methodology is suitable for analyses based on a ‘small 
time/large observations’ sample.6 GMM is a powerful estimator for analyses based on firm-level data 
mainly for three reasons (Roodman, 2009). First, GMM is one of the best techniques to control for 
all sources of endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory variables, by using internal 
instruments, namely the lagged levels of the explanatory variables, which allows us to address dual 
causality, if rising financial payments and incomes is also a consequence of the slowdown in the 
capital accumulation. The instrument set consists of instruments that are not correlated with the first 
difference of the error term, but correlated with the variable we are estimating. Second, by first-
differencing variables, this estimator eliminates companies’ unobservable fixed effects. Third, GMM 
can efficiently address autocorrelation problems. We apply two tests to assess the appropriateness of 
the instrument sets, and lag structures. First, we check for second-order serial correlation with the 
Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, we verify the validity of the instruments sets 
                                                          
6 The full period is 29 years, but the average period for which all the variables are available is 6-9 years. 
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through the Hansen test.7 In all models, the lagged dependent variable enters the instrument set as 
endogenous while all other explanatory variables enter as predetermined regressors. Consistently, the 
instrument sets include the second and third lags of the lagged dependent variable, and the first and 
second lags of the other lagged explanatory variables.  We test the joint significance of the time 
dummies, and the consistency of the interaction dummies on financial income using a Wald test. 
All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships between the 
dependent and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the logarithmic scale enables us to reduce the 
disturbances coming from the presence of heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are calculated 
through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005).  
All the estimations for the country groups come from weighted regressions, with the weights 
equal to 1 divided by the number of available observations in that country. This procedure mitigates 
the bias in the results coming from the highest data availability for several countries.   
Finally, we apply a general-to-specific estimation procedure, to arrive at a specification with 
only significant variables.   
 
6. Estimation results   
The first part of this section presents our estimation results based on Equations (1) and (2) discussed 
in section 3. In the second part we provide the economic effects of our estimates. Table 2 presents the 
results for groups of countries as well as country-specific estimations for selected countries based on 
equation (1). As expected, the lagged level of accumulation, sales, and operating profit have a general 
positive effects on investment. However, the statistical significance of profitability is borderline in 
Europe. Moreover, with this specification we found highly insignificant effect of profitability in 
Japan, South Korea, South Africa, India, and China. Aggregated financial payments (dividends and 
interest) have a significant and negative effect on the rate of accumulation in both the developed and 
developing world in all country groups as well as estimations for selected individual countries other 
than India and China. The negative effect is particularly high in the aggregate group of Developing 
countries, BRICS, and South Africa. In China and India the effects of total financial payments are 
statistically insignificant.  
                                                          
7  Hansen test takes the orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of 
consistency between estimated and sample moments. We tested and confirmed the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in our sample by using the White/Koenker and the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-
Weisberg tests. Hansen’s-J test is preferred to the Sargan test in the presence of heteroskedasticity 
(Roodman, 2009). However, the Hansen test (as the Sargan test) is sensitive to the total number of 
instruments. Therefore, we use only the first and second lags of our variables as instruments. Furthermore, 
all instruments are ‘collapsed’, thus having an instrument for each variable and lag distance. 
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 According to the results in Table 2, the impact of non-operating financial income (πF/K) on 
investment is mixed. We find a significant negative effect of financial income on investment only in 
Europe (-0.06), BRICS (-0.05), and India (-0.14). The effect of financial income in China is positive 
and highly significant (0.13).  For the other countries and for the developing and emerging group as 
a whole the aggregate effect of total financial income is statistically insignificant.  
However, as already discussed in section 3, theoretically the sign of the effect of non-
operating income on physical accumulation is ambiguous. On the one hand, relatively smaller 
companies may use this additional source of income to partially ease liquidity constraints. On the 
other hand, the larger and more flexible non-financial companies may see short-term and reversible 
financial investment as an attractive alternative to physical investment. This choice may then come 
at the expense of long-term physical investment, and thus has an adverse on the rate of accumulation 
of these large corporations. In other words, the heterogeneity that naturally characterizes firms can 
play an important role in the analysis of the effects of financial income on investment (Tori and 
Onaran, 2015; 2017). We explored this possible dual, non-linear effect, by including an interaction 
dummy variable to account for the potentially different effect of financial income with respect to the 
size of the company (measured in terms of total assets). In these alternative specifications, as 
described in Equation (2) in section 2, the coefficient associated with the variable πF/K show the 
effect of companies in the different top percentiles of the distribution. To compute the elasticity for 
the remaining companies we add the coefficient for (πF/K)*Dn and the coefficient for πF/K. There is 
indeed evidence that the impact of financial income differ with respect to the size of the company; 
however, the size, which is the percentile of the companies in terms of the distribution of total assets 
for which we capture these opposite effects is not the same for every country/group. The results are 
reported in Table 3 for the countries/groups where we were able to find a statistically significant 
difference between the large and small companies with respect to the impact of financial incomes.   
In the US, in the top 40 per cent companies in terms of total assets financial incomes has a 
strongly negative effect on investment; we also find the similar opposite effects also with interaction 
dummies at 80 per cent, 70 per cent, and 60 per cent levels of disaggregation. Thus in the largest 40 
per cent of the companies the impact is negative, while rate of accumulation of the remaining 60 per 
cent partially benefit from non-operating activities.  
For the NFCs in Japan in the top 20 per cent of the distribution in terms of total assets the 
effect of financial incomes on accumulation is again strongly negative, while the effect for the lowest 
80 per cent is positive, with a coefficient equal to 0.24. 
For the companies in the Developing and Emerging group, the effect for the companies in the 
top 60 per cent of the distribution is negative but insignificant. The introduction of the size effects 
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result in a significant negative impact of financial incomes on the lowest 40 per cent. For this group 
we find that, overall, even the smaller companies are characterized by a negative elasticity of financial 
incomes on accumulation.  
Larger South Korean companies (top 10 per cent) experience the strongest negative effects 
(crowding-out effect) of non-operating income on real investment with the highest estimated 
coefficient (-1.26). The remaining 90 per cent of the sample experience a significant and positive 
impact (0.11). South Korean companies show similar different behaviours also when comparing top 
and bottom 50 per cent of the total assets distribution. In South Africa, total financial incomes have 
a positive effect for the small companies that lie on the bottom 70 per cent of the distribution of total 
assets (0.08). On the contrary, the largest companies in the top 30 per cent of the distribution 
experienced a negative impact of non-operating incomes on their rate of accumulation (-0.43).   
The negative impacts of total financial payments on investment are robust to the inclusion of the size 
dummies in all these specifications, apart from Japan. In addition, in this specification, the coefficient 
of operating profit in the case of Japan has improved, and is now significant and positive (the 
significance of this variable is improving also in the case of S. Korea, although is still borderline 
insignificant). Hence, overall the results in Table 3 reflects a better specification for some countries. 
Finally, we do not find significant and robust evidence of any non-linearity in the effect of 
financial income on the investment of the NFCs in Europe, BRICS, India, and China. Hence, in 
Europe, BRICS as a whole, and India financial income has a negative effect on investment in the 
small as well as large NFCs.   
The elasticities discussed above provide a partial picture about the various effects of 
financialisation on investment. Table 4 presents the long-run coefficients, the actual cumulative 
changes, and the economic effects based on the estimations in Table 2 for the countries that do not 
show evidence of non-linearity in the impact of financial income (i.e. Europe, BRICS, India, and 
China). We first compute the long-run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one minus 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run elasticity by the actual 
cumulative change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic 
effect. We compute the economic effects for the period of 1995-2007, thus excluding the impact of 
the financial crisis, after which financial activities have been overall severely affected.  
Looking at the two control variables, in general sales had a stronger positive effect on 
investment compared to the profit rate. With respect to financial payments, BRICS experience the 
strongest negative economic effect on investment: investment has been 5.3 per cent lower due to the 
rise in financial payments during 1995-2007. This effect is null in the case of India and China where 
the estimated coefficient was statistically insignificant. With respect to financial incomes, the 
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evidence is mixed. The economic effect of financial incomes has been negative in both BRICS and 
Europe (-5.3 and -4.6 per cent respectively), whilst it has been positive in India and China (21.9 and 
4 per cent respectively). It has to be noted that, for China the positive effect is resulting from both 
positive long-run coefficient and actual cumulative change, while in the case of India this is due to a 
strong reduction in financial incomes during the period considered despite a negative coefficient.  
Table 5 presents the long-run coefficients, the actual changes, and the economic effects based 
on the estimated elasticities in Table 3. Also for this group of estimations, the economic impact of 
sales on investment is by far larger than the one of profit (on average 21 vs. 2 per cent). With respect 
to aggregate financial payments, the large  firms in the group of Developing and Emerging countries 
experience the strongest negative effect, where investment declines by 12.9 per cent due to the rise 
in financial payments, followed by S. Africa (-2.8 per cent), and USA (-2 per cent). In Japan, the 
economic effect is null due to an insignificant long-run coefficient, whilst in S. Korea this effect has 
been positive due to a negative actual cumulative change. These results provide a strong evidence of 
the negative impact of interest and dividends payments on accumulation across the world, except for 
Japan, India, and China. 
The evidence about economic effects of financial incomes is, as expected, mixed. In general, 
the economic effect is negative for larger companies. Although the effects are not fully comparable 
due to the different size thresholds, larger companies in S. Korea experience the strongest negative 
impact on the rate of accumulation due to rising financial incomes (-64.8 per cent). Larger companies 
in the USA experience a negative impact of -6.2 per cent. In Japan, due to the combination of a small 
fall in financial incomes and a strongly negative long-run coefficient, the economic effect turns 
slightly positive (0.5 per cent). On the contrary, the economic effect of financial incomes is positive 
for relatively smaller companies. Smaller companies in S. Korea are the ones for which investment 
benefited most from financial incomes (7.5 per cent), followed by the ones in Japan (6.7 per cent), S. 
Africa (2.4 per cent), and the USA (0.8 per cent). In the group of NFCs in developing and emerging 
countries, the effect is negative (-1.8 per cent) for the smaller companies (the ones in the lowest 40 
per cent of the distribution) due to a negative long-run coefficient.  
 
8. Conclusion   
In this article we present empirical evidence on the effects of financialisation on firm-level investment 
in the publicly listed NFCs in both the developed and developing world. We show that 
financialisation, depicted as the increasing orientation towards external financing, and the internal 
substitution of fixed capital accumulation by financial activity, has a fundamental role in suppressing 
investment in the NFCs. The lower availabilty of internal funds constrains the investment decision. 
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On the one hand, the increase in financial payments for external finance and to favor the shareholders 
(interest and dividends) reduce the NFCs internal funds, and thus physical capital accumulation. On 
the other hand, the negative crowding-out effects of financial investment on accumulation more than 
offset the gains from relaxing the cash-flow constraint. Financial incomes have a positive effect on 
investment only for the smaller companies in some country groups, but a significant negative effect 
in the large companies in both the developed and devleoping world. Larger companies create the vast 
majority of capital, and the crowding out of physical investment of these companies by financial 
activity is a substantial drag on the investment performance and productivity of these countries. 
The only exceptions to significant negative effects of financial income on investment (both at 
the aggregate level and when controlling for companies’ size) is China, where we find a positive 
effect of financial income. In addition, although in India the estimated elasticity for financial income 
is negative, a negative actual change in the variable results in a positive economic effect. Furthermore, 
both in China and India financial payments do not have a significant impact on investment. These 
findings highlight the importance of further research in understanding the role of the State and 
industrial policy in shaping investment, and the link between finance and investment in these 
countries.  
These results provide support to the theoretical arguments regarding the overwhelming 
negative effects of financialisation and confirm previous empirical findings at the macro and 
microeconomic levels in the literature, albeit some diversity. The increasing interrelations between 
the financial markets and the NFCs are progressively reducing fixed capital accumulation, and thus 
growth. These results contrast with the conventional arguments regarding the beneficial effects of 
financial liberalization and financial deepening.  
To reach a stable and vigorous dynamic of investment, a de-financialisation of the non-
financial sector is desirable. This requires an extended regulation of companies’ non-operating 
financial activities along with financial regulation.   
The investigations of the determinants of companies’ ‘financial accumulation’, the sources of 
businesses’ financial assets, as well as the impact of different institutional settings are important 
questions for future research.  
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 Figure 1.a Investment/operating income (I/π), developed countries 
 
 
Figure 1.b Investment/operating income (I/π), developing and emerging countries 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 2.1a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), the USA                   
Figure 2.1b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), the USA 
  
Figure 2.2a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), Europe                                         
Figure 2.2b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), Europe 
  
 
Figure 2.3a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), Japan                                      
Figure 2.3b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), Japan 
  
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 2.4a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), Developing Countries                 
Figure 2.4b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), 
Developing Countries 
  
Figure 2.5a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), BRICS                                                
Figure 2.5b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial 
payments/total assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets 
(πF/K), BRICS                          
  
 
Figure 2.6a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), S. Korea                                           
Figure 2.6b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), S. Korea 
  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 2.7a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), S. Africa                                            
Figure 2.7b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), S. Africa  
  
  
Figure 2.8a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), India  
Figure 2.8b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), India 
  
Figure 2.9a Investment/operating income (I/π), financial 
assets/total assets (FA/K), China                                                  
Figure 2.9b Rate of accumulation (I/K), financial payments/total 
assets (F/K), and financial incomes/ total assets (πF/K), China  
  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Table 1. Composition of the country groups. 
Europe BRICS 
Developing and 
Emerging 
 
 
 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy Luxembourg 
Norway 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
 
Brazil 
Russia 
India 
China 
S. Africa 
 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Egypt 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Peru 
Russia 
Singapore 
S. Africa 
South Korea 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
 Vietnam 
 
USA  
 
Japan 
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Table 2. Estimation results based on Equation (1), dependent variable rate of accumulation, (I/K)t  
 USA Europe BRICS Japan 
Developing 
and 
Emerging 
S. Korea S. Africa India China 
(
𝐼
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.327*** 
(0.000) 
0.398*** 
(0.000) 
0.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.219*** 
(0.000) 
0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.287*** 
(0.000) 
0.308*** 
(0.000) 
0.486*** 
(0.000) 
0.154* 
(0.092) 
(
𝑆
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.397*** 
(0.000) 
0.317** 
(0.002) 
0.359*** 
(0.000) 
1.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.349*** 
(0.000) 
0.720*** 
(0.000) 
0.220*** 
(0.021) 
0.367* 
(0.098) 
0.422** 
(0.028) 
(
𝜋
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.050*** 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.112) 
0.044*** 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.640) 
0.043*** 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.880) 
0.040 
(0.316) 
0.054 
(0.236) 
0.055 
(0.374) 
(
𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
-0.072*** 
(0.000) 
-0.059*** 
(0.008) 
-0.137*** 
(0.001) 
-0.276** 
(0.024) 
-0.097*** 
(0.000) 
-0.078** 
(0.013) 
-0.119*** 
(0.001) 
-0.065 
(0.623) 
-0.110 
(0.192) 
(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.034 
(0.171) 
-0.061** 
(0.027) 
-0.045* 
(0.097) 
-0.074 
(0.350) 
0.017 
(0.584) 
0.021 
(0.651) 
-0.030 
(0.480) 
-0.136** 
(0.033) 
0.134*** 
(0.009) 
Number of observations 11948 22240 15164 16467 31983 6665 2057 8670 2781 
Number of firms 1659 2846 3394 1941 6463 1245 230 1470 1414 
Number of Instruments 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
p-value  A-B test (AR2) 0.772 0.512 0.122 0.140 0.560 0.249 0.124 0.287 0.509 
p-value  Hansen test 0.630 0.232 0.417 0.122 0.349 0.169 0.112 0.380 0.682 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
p-value Wald test for 
time effects 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All estimations based on Equation (1) period 1995-2015. Two-step difference-GMM estimations with robust standard errors. Coefficients for the year 
dummies are not reported. p-values in parenthesis. *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. 
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Table 3. Estimation results based on Equation (2), dependent variable rate of accumulation, (I/K)t  
 USA Japan 
Developing 
and 
Emerging 
S. Korea S. Africa 
(
𝐼
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.348*** 
(0.000) 
0.206*** 
(0.000) 
0.360*** 
(0.000) 
0.292*** 
(0.000) 
0.324*** 
(0.000) 
(
𝑆
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.377*** 
(0.000) 
0.809** 
(0.000) 
0.354*** 
(0.000) 
0.705*** 
(0.000) 
0.240** 
(0.015) 
(
𝜋
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.001) 
0.024 
(0.117) 
0.034 
(0.413) 
(
𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
-0.051** 
(0.015)) 
-0.128 
(0.235) 
-0.091*** 
(0.000) 
-0.076** 
(0.017) 
-0.098*** 
(0.010) 
(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
 
-0.255*** 
(0.000) 
-0.899* 
(0.064) 
-0.023 
(0.439) 
-1.262** 
(0.022) 
-0.426* 
(0.077) 
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷90]
𝑡−1
    
1.375** 
(0.012) 
 
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷80]
𝑡−1
  
1.138** 
(0.031) 
   
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷70]
𝑡−1
     
0.501* 
(0.099) 
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷60]
𝑡−1
 0.425*** 
(0.001) 
    
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷50]
𝑡−1
      
[(
𝜋𝐹
𝐾
)
𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷40]
𝑡−1
   
-0.141*** 
(0.001) 
  
Number of observations 11948 7652 31983 6665 2057 
Number of firms 1659 1596 6463 1245 230 
Number of Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 
p-value  A-B test (AR2) 0.897 0.269 0.611 0.168 0.159 
p-value  Hansen test 0.496 0.424 0.385 0.211 0.171 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
p-value Wald test for 
time effects 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
p-value  Wald test for β5+β6=0 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.038 
All estimations based on Equation (2) period 1995-2015. Two-step difference-GMM estimations with 
robust standard errors. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. p-values in parenthesis. 
*significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. 
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Table 4. Economic effects, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Economic effects, disaggregation by size of firm, 1995-2007 
 
Country/
group
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Europe 0.527 0.405 0.213 0.000 0.667 0.000 -0.098 0.400 -0.039 -0.101 0.457 -0.046
BRICS 0.528 0.391 0.207 0.065 0.066 0.004 -0.201 0.196 -0.053 -0.066 0.804 -0.053
India 0.714 0.317 0.226 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 -0.512 0.000 -0.265 -0.828 0.219
China 0.499 0.624 0.311 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 -0.880 0.000 0.158 0.251 0.040
S/K π/K F/K π F /K
Country/group
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
Long-run 
coefficient
Actual 
cumulative 
change 
Economic 
Effect
USA 0.578 0.199 0.115 0.069 0.180 0.012 -0.078 0.284 -0.022 -0.391 0.067 -0.026 0.261 0.030 0.008
Japan 1.019 0.322 0.328 0.057 0.402 0.023 0.000 0.133 0.000 -1.132 -0.004 0.005 0.301 0.221 0.067
Developing and Emerging 0.553 0.474 0.262 0.066 0.427 0.028 -0.142 0.909 -0.129 0.000 0.185 0.000 -0.064 0.285 -0.018
S.Korea 0.996 0.337 0.335 0.000 0.111 0.000 -0.107 -0.262 0.028 -1.782 0.364 -0.648 0.160 0.468 0.075
S.Africa 0.355 0.424 0.151 0.000 0.376 0.000 -0.145 0.308 -0.045 -0.630 0.201 -0.127 0.111 0.213 0.024
π F /K (small)S/K π/K F/K π F /K (big)
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Appendices  
 
 
Table 1A. Variable definitions and codes 
Symbol Variable Definition Worldscope Code 
I Investment Addition to fixed assets WC04601 
K Capital stock Net fixed capital stock WC02501 
S Sales Net sales WC01001 
π Profit rate Operating income WC01250 
F 
Financial 
Payments 
Interest + cash dividends paid 
WC01251 +  
WC04551 
πF 
Non-operating 
profit 
Non-operating profit from 
interest and dividends 
WC01266 +  
WC01268 
FA 
Financial 
assets 
Cash, other investment, short-
term investment, other current 
assets 
WC02003 + WC02250 + 
WC02008 + WC02149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
